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Term limits: A Message to Congress
by Robert Karlinsey
Over the past few years publIc sentiment has rapIdly grown In favor of hmItIng allowable
terms in office for elected federal officials. In many states measures have already passed
limiting senators of representatives to a specified number of terms. Understanding term
limits requires an understanding of the arguments proponents use to support their passage and
of arguments opponents use to resist their passage. While term limits will probably decrease
"careerism" and incumbent return rate in national politics, they constitute only a brief and
periodic solution to the problem. Reforms in campaign finance laws might strike closer to
the cause of careerism that has so many Americans upset.

On 7 November 1991, the most
stinging term limit initiative ever to be
considered was on the ballot in
Washington State. Setting a record for
statewide turnout during an off-year
election, Washington voters decided
against having term limits imposed on
elected federal officials (Egan 1991).
Washington's United States Representative
and Speaker of the House Tom Foley
worked hard for the measure's defeat--if
passed, the term limitations would be
retroactive, meaning that Tom Foley, a
long time United States Representative
since 1965, would be automatically ousted
in the next election. Knowing this, Foley
campaigned vigorously, using scare tactics
such as the possibility that the Washington
delegation would lose its seniority and
influence in Congress. Speaker Foley
didn't have to say much to get his point
across; in fact, his most effective speech
was just one word: "California." This
word was especially poignant because most
everyone knew that California was a huge,
powerful state that had the potential to
walk allover smaller states like
Washington. Foley claimed that
Washington's only defense against states
like California, its seniority power in
Congress, would be lost if Washingtonians

voted "yes" on the proposition (Will 1992,
222).
This was not the first time that term
limits had appeared in state-wide elections.
In 1990, California, Colorado, and
Oklahoma voted in favor of term limits.
Colorado, however, was the only state out
of the three that voted to limit the terms of
federal offices.
Thanks to the term limit measure's
defeat in Tom Foley's state, proponents of
term limits nationwide learned a valuable
lesson: If term limit measures are to pass,
they cannot be too harsh (i.e., retroactive).
Following the Washington episode,
advocates of the term limit movement
rolled up their sleeves and went to work.
By the 1992 general election, 14 states had
term limit measures on their ballots, and
none of them were punitive or retroactive
like the guinea pig measure that had failed
the previous year in Washington.
Never before had the same issue been
voted on at the same time in so many
states (Gross 1992). This clearly reflected
a sour mood and a desire for change that
had been accumulating throughout the
nation. In particular, the public was tired
of a Congress that was seen as an
entrenched institution in need of a major
overhaul. The House Banking and Post
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Office scandals, the embarrassing way in
which Senators handled the Clarence
Thomas hearings, a national debt of $4
trillion (Rudolph et al. 1992), porkbarreling, and other practices contributed
to the Ubiquitous, anti-incumbent
atmosphere.
On the day of the general election, 3
November 1992, all 14 of the term limit
measures passed. Colorado was no longer
the lone federal term-limit state; it was
now one among 15 states that had passed
term limits for federal offices. However,
voters of those same states who said "yes"
to term limits also sent their incumbent
candidates back to Capitol Hill.
Nationwide, 93 percent of the incumbents
seeking reelection won their races. It was
as if voters were sending the bizarre
message, "Stop me before I vote again"
(Woshinsky 1992, 19).
All 15 of the term-limiting states
prevent Senators from serving for more
than 12 years, and the limitations on
House members varies with each state.
Eight of the 15 states restrict their
Representatives to serving for no more
than 6 years, 4 set the limit at 8 years, and
3 prevent ballot access after 12 years of
service in the House.
With advocates in Utah working to
have a term limit measure on the ballot in
time for the state's next election, Utahns
will begin to see the debate gain more
prominence. As it does gain more
attention, the arguments for and against
term limits will be made, and Utah voters
will have the chance to weigh both sides.
This paper will explore four areas of the
term limit issue. First, it will examine the
popUlarity and success of the term limit
movement. Second, the relationship
between ideology and term limit approval
will be explored. Third, arguments for
and against term limits will be presented.
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Fourth, a case will be made in favor of
alternative measures to term limits, with
an emphasis on campaign finance reform.

The Success of the Tenn Limit
Movement
The term limit movement has definitely
gained momentum. Term limit groups are
already circulating petitions in the six
remaining states that have initiative access.
Although proponents are pleased with their
initiative success, their ultimate goal is a
constitutional amendment that would
legalize term limits for federal offices
throughout the entire nation. Since the
1992 term limit measures passed in all 14
states, the possibility for an amendment is
greatly enhanced. "I would be very
surprised if Congress had the nerve to
deny it [passage of the amendment] at this
point," said James Coyne, co-chairman of
an interest group called Americans to
Limit Congressional Terms (Holmstrom
1992, 5).
Whether or not term limits make it
through the amendment process, the public
seems to be in favor of them. In the 1992
KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll, 82 percent
of Utah voters said "yes" to term limits
(margin of error is about 2 percent).
Therefore, it is likely that if Utah held an
off-year election today, a measure limiting
the terms of federal officials would pass.
Similarly, voters nationwide also seemed
to be in favor of term limits. A national
survey conducted by the Gallup
Organization showed that 67 percent of
those polled were in favor of term limits
(Jimmerson 1993).
It is also interesting to note that Utah's
first congressional district voters were in
harmony with the "stop me before I vote
again" paradox common to other states in
the nation: Jim Hansen, a Congressman
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going into his seventh term, was reelected.
Of those that voted for Hansen, 84 percent
approved term limits. This type of
behavior is found in many American
voters that say "Clean up Congress! Get
those bums out of there--except for my
Congressman, of course. He's the only
honest one in the bunch."
Although the term limit movement has
gained nation-wide popularity, some feel
that this momentum is based on a shaky
foundation, namely, public discontent with
government. If the Clinton Administration
can change the public's current view on
government, term-limit supporters may
dissipate quicldy (Galvin 1992).
The Influence of Ideology on the Tenn
Limit Movement
Although the length of term limits
varies from state to state, the proponents
seem to share common attitudes, and in
particular, the movement sends a whiff of
conservatism. This conservative influence
exists for at least two reasons. First,
many if not most conservatives are of the
Republican persuasion; lawmakers of this
party have been unable to control Congress
for quite a while (except for their brief
stint in the Senate in the early 1980's), and
they hope that term limits will help. to shift
the majority into Republican hands.
Second, conservatives believe in the
concept of limited power in government;
enacting term limits, they believe, will put
a stop to the accumulation of power that
the so-called "professional" or "career"
politicians acquire.
Evidence of conservative overtones in
the term limit movement can be seen from
the KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll. Term
limits were approved by a wide margin no
matter what ideology the respondents
claimed; nevertheless, ideology did seem
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to wield a degree of influence on the
tendency to say "yes" to term limits.
Conservatives were more likely to approve
of term limits than were liberals. Table 1
illustrates this tendency. A majority of
liberals as well as conservatives approved
of term limits, but this majority was
smaller for liberals (70 percent) than it
was for conservatives (86 percent). This
greater tendency for conservatives to
approve of term limits may be explained
by the conservative view that decreased
power in government is better. Liberals,
on the other hand, are generally more
permissive of increased power in
government.
On the national level, the greater
tendency for conservatives to sanction term
limits was also evident. In April 1992, the
Gallup Organization polled 1004 registered
voters randomly selected throughout the
United States. Not unlike the KBYU/Utah
Colleges Exit Poll results, term limits were
favored by a majority of both
conservatives and liberals. Furthermore,
conservatives (68 percent) were more
likely to favor term limits than liberals (58
Table 1. Term limit support among
conservatives and liberals.
% Conservatives

% Liberals

Yes

85.56

69.71

No

12.27

22.94

2.17

7.35

Don't
Know

Source: KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll, 1992.

percent) (Jimmerson 1993). Proponents
correctly assert that the term limit
movement is bipartisan, generally favored
by conservatives and liberals alike. On the
other hand, conservatives are indeed more
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likely to favor the movement more than
liberals.

The Arguments For and Against Tenn
Limits
Needless to say, the term limit
movement has not been able to avoid
controversy. The topic is a heated one,
with credible arguments on both sides of
the issue. The most prominent arguments
include the following:
The Paradox
Those who are against term limits
claim that the public doesn't really know
what it wants because in the last election,
while all 14 of the measures passed, 93
percent of the incumbents that made it to
the general election were reelected. This
paradoxical behavior shows that the public
is either hypocritical or has not made up
its mind. Term limit advocates, however,
assert that voting for term limits as well as
incumbents is not hypocritical; rather, such
behavior merely reinforces the term limit
argument, showing just how much of an
advantage incumbents actually have
(Petracca 1992).
.
But opponents counter by saying that
the term limit movement is an antiCongress hysteria driven by "unstoppable
populism," not by reason and common
sense (Woshinsky 1992). Although it is
true that many Americans are unhappy
with Congress, they should not channel
this discontent towards a drastic reform
about which most Americans know next to
nothing. However, term limit advocates
can argue that, unstoppable populism or
not, the electorate voted for term limits in
their respective states, and anyone who
upholds democratic values should respect
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the democratically passed term limit
measures.
The Incumbent Advantage
In the last general election, 93 percent
of the incumbents were reelected, political
action committees gave nine times as much
money to incumbents as they did to
challengers (Osgood 1992), and most
challengers were unable to compete with
their opponents in campaign expenditures.
Proponents of term limits often state facts
like these when using the incumbent
advantage as an argument for term limits.
They assert that limiting the terms of
incumbents will reinvigorate Congress with
new faces and new ideas, while those
against term limits claim that the good
incumbents will be thrown out with the
bad.
In elections, incumbents have a big
advantage over their challengers for the
following reasons. First, political action
committees and other contributors want to
put their money on the winner. Since the
incumbent has already shown that he or
she can win an election, most of the
contributions will be given to the
incumbent. A challenger's chances of
winning an election are somewhat greater
if he or she can outspend the incumbent,
but such an occurrence is rare (Erikson et
al. 1991, 320). Second, incumbents have
automatic name recognition due to
previous elections and media coverage.
The electorate is more likely to vote for a
name they recognize. Third, incumbents
have free mailing, or "franking" privileges
which enable them to campaign directly to
their constituents while the government
foots the bill. Finally, incumbents have
the advantage of a government-paid staff
that can keep them current on the issues in
case they engage in a debate. Each of the
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factors listed above contribute to the
uneven playing field on which incumbents
are favored.
As a result, proponents argue that since
incumbents are reasonably secure from
defeat on election day, there is less
incentive to meet the needs of the entire
district and more incentive to cater to the
special interest groups (both within and
without their constituencies) that fund their
reelection campaigns. After all, without
campaign contributions, the incumbent
advantage would significantly diminish.
Term limits, advocates claim, would put
an end to the incumbent advantage since
open seat elections would be more
frequent.
Opponents, on the other hand, assert
that term limits would eliminate the
incumbent advantage only once every
twelve years or whenever the terms expire.
This would cause serious, credible
challengers to wait a few years until the
seat becomes open, thus reinforcing the
incumbent advantage while the
incumbent's terms have not yet expired.
As a result, incumbents would ignore the
public and cater to special interests more
than ever. Opponents also argue that there
are less drastic, more practical options-such as campaign finance reform--that
would attack the incumbent advantage
more effectively.
Turnout
It has been statistically shown that
increased campaign spending does not
significantly lead to increased voter
participation. In The Money Chase,
Magleby and Nelson state that
"competition, however, does lead to higher
turnout, while expenditure imbalances
between candidates reduce it" (1990, 42).
Term limits will increase the frequency of
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open seats, and since political action
committees tend to give money to both
candidates in an open-seat election,
competition will increase, and therefore
voter turnout will improve. With this in
mind, term limit advocates claim that the
disproportional voice of lobbying groups
will be diminished by more voters coming
out to the polls. Opponents can argue that
there is no evidence to support that an
increase in turnout will mute lobbyists,
and even if this was the case, term limits
would only improve turnout once every six
to twelve years, depending on the term
limit.
Careerism
Term limit advocates decry "career"
politicians who look only towards
reelection and the interest groups that fund
their campaigns. Under the current
system, they say, members of Congress
feel successful if they are able to bring
home lots of money in the way of
entitlements, programs, and "pork."
Proponents call this behavior "careerism"
(Wi111992, 9), claiming that elected
officials will do just about anything to
keep their jobs as politicians. "To hell
with the deficit, to hell with America, I
have to get reelected next fall!" is what
some proponents might expect to hear
from an incumbent unrestrained by a term
limit.
Proponents claim that the soaring
deficit is a direct result of careerist attitude
among politicians. But the anti-term limit
argument is that the "I have to get
reelected next fall" attitude will only be
stopped after incumbents serve their terms,
which is every six to twelve years. They
also assert that term limits will not stop
careerism; politicians will simply hop from
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one elected position to another (Magleby
1993a).
Opponents use another word to
describe the system under term limits-"amateurism." If term limits are imposed,
Congress will lose its expert legislators
and be full of ignorant freshmen who will
make bad mistakes. Proponents counter
by saying that politicians are already
making bad mistakes, and besides,
amateurism is good--American politics was
never intended to be made up of career
politicians. As far as expertise is
concerned, term limit advocates claim that
representative government has failed if it
requires experts to be as skilled as
neurosurgeons. Furthermore, George Will
uses the executive branch as an example to
argue that a lifetime career is not required
in order to be affective in American
government:
If government is really such an arcane business,
how is it that the executive branch departments and
agencies are run, year in and year out, by Cabinet
and sub-Cabinet officers who come into government
for stints of eight or (usually) fewer years? (1992, 58)

Those against term limits claim that
term-limited politicians will fall prey to
corporate interest groups. Since members
of Congress will stay only for a few short
years, it is in their best interest to use their
temporary position as a spring board for
their post-political careers. Therefore,
especially during their last term, they will
try to cater to special corporate interests
that may provide employment in the
future. Proponents, on the other hand,
claim that the damage done every year by
the legislative careerist under the current
system is far worse than what term-limited
politicians mayor may not do during their
last term. Furthermore, George Will
reasons that special interest groups will not
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even want to hire ex -congressmen whose
terms were limited:
Think about it. One reason ex-legislators are hired
by private interests today is to take advantage of their
relationships with ex-colleagues who remain in
Congress. But term limits will guarantee that those
relationships are short-lived. Those ex-colleagues
will soon be ex-congressmen. (1992, 212)

Accountability
Anti-term limit people argue that
during the incumbents' final terms in
office, they will have virtually no incentive
to legislate on behalf of their constituents,
since the only check against them,
reelection, is no longer existent. Oliver
Woshinsky claims that "the threat of
ejection keeps them honest," and term
limits will remove that threat. In fact, if
term limits were applied to all incumbents
right now, about one third of our public
officials would be serving their last terms,
which means that they would face no
electoral check on their behavior (1992).
Without this check, lawmakers would be
vulnerable to the influences of special
interest groups that encourage pork-barrel
politics and a massive deficit.
Proponents counter that career
politicians entrenched in their positions are
the ones who have fallen prey to the
interest groups. Always looking after the
needs of those who fund their reelection
campaigns, careerists fail to look at the
aggregate interests of the nation and
instead focus on the pork-barrel politics
that make their interest groups happy.
Constitutionality
Opponents declare that term limits will
not stand up before the Supreme Court.
Article I section 2 of the United States
Constitution states that there are only three
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qualifications for membership in Congress:
age, citizenship, and residency. Term
limits add a fourth qualification and are
therefore unconstitutional. This argument
was upheld in Powell v. McCormack. In
this case, Congress denied Adam Clayton
Powell a seat in the House because of
ethical misconduct. Asserting that age,
citizenship, and residency were the only
qualifications necessary for admittance into
Congress, the Supreme Court ruled in
favor of Powell. Opponents to term limits
claim that they violate the Constitution on
the same ground that Congress did in
Powell (1969, 486).
However, Article I section 4 dictates
that states have authority to set "times,
places, and manner of holding elections for
Senators and Representatives." Proponents
use this part of the Constitution to assert
that limiting terms falls under the states'
authority to set the "manner of holding
elections." Nonetheless, many advocates
for term limits concede on the
constitutionality issue. Their main goal,
therefore, is to make term limits
constitutional via the amendment process.
Since the Supreme Court does not usually
act until someone is directly affected, term
limits will probably not be challenged in
court until at least 1999, which is when
the first federal officials will reach their
limits. Proponents hope that by then term
limits will be passed in the form of an
amendment to the Constitution.
Increased Power of Staff, Bureaucrats, and
Lobbyists
Since staffers, bureaucrats, and
lobbyists are not elected, they can remain
a part of the legislative process for as long
as they can keep their jobs. Opponents to
term limits reason that these groups will be
more experienced and have "better

Karlinsey--Term Limits: A Message to Congress

command of the territory" than the termlimited Congressmen who are relatively
new on Capitol Hill (Will 1992, 56), and
lobbyists, staffers, and bureaucrats would
tend to interact with each other more than
with the elected officials Therefore,
limiting terms would put more power in
the hands of staffers, lobbyists, and
bureaucrats. Coyne rejects this argument,
stating that:
The reason that the 30-year veteran of the
bureaucracy has power is because he's been a buddy
for 30 years of an entrenched congressman and a
powerful lobbyist. The people have no power to
throw out the lobbyist or the power to fire the
bureaucrats, but we do have the power to keep the
congressmen from being entrenched. (Holmstrom
1992)

Even if this long-term relationship does
not exist, George Will adds that "the vast
majority of congressional staffers are not
career people." House staff serve for an
average of 5.0 years, and Senate staff
serve for an average of 5.7 years (1992,
57). These periods are less than any
proposed term limit, so how can staffers
gain more expertise than the Congressmen
who, on average, will be on Capitol Hill
longer than the staffers will?
Lobbyists, on the other hand, are
indeed professionals. Nevertheless, they
are opposed to term limits because they
flourish from the "long-term relationships
of mutual aggrandizement with career
legislators" (Will 1992, 57). Lobbyists
will have less influence since they will not
be as "buddy-buddy" with Congressmen.
And bureaucrats also dislike term limits,
since their power as well as their jobs
often depend on serving the long-term
needs of professional lawmakers (these
long-term needs are fulfilled when
perpetual government programs satisfy
campaign contributors) (Will 1992, 57).
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Causes v. Symptoms

Alternatives to Term Limits

Advocates promote the idea that term
limits will attract more enlightened,
"citizen" legislators who will not give in to
the temptations of campaign donations,
perks, and privileges. These term-limited
lawmakers, they claim, will come to
Washington to serve the public rather than
to accumulate campaign war chests that
will ensure a self-interested political
career. They also say that voter turnout
and participation will improve after term
limits have invigorated Congress and
increased election competition. In other
words, proponents are convinced that
limiting congressional terms will cure
much of the government's ills.
On the other hand, the opposition
asserts that term limits will not cure the
ills of American government--they will
merely go after the symptoms. Limiting
the number of terms a lawmaker can serve
will fail to deal directly with the problems
that motivated the term-limit movement in
the first place. Such problems include an
ever-expanding government, the
dominance of money in elections, public
apathy, and congressional perks and
privileges. Opponents to term limits argue
that each of these problems would persist
if term limits were imposed, and if they
were to have any effect at all, term limits
would only provide relief from these
problems periodically--once every six to
twelve years. In other words, term limits
would only attack the symptoms, not the
causes, of the problems that vex our
government; they would act as a
temporary bandage that would be applied
occasionally, only to be stripped off almost
as soon as it was put on. Opponents,
therefore, prescribe other alternatives to
limiting terms.

As just mentioned above, opponents to
the term limit movement suggest that other
reform measures can more effectively
remove the causes of the predicaments that
face lawmakers and the electorate. Below
several proposals are advocated, with an
emphasis in favor of campaign finance
reform.
Term Limits for Committee Chairs
Lawmakers greatly enhance their
incumbent advantage when they work their
way up through Congress's seniority
system and chair strategic committees.
Chairing a committee means more 'power,
which in tum increases campaign
contributions, which in tum makes it more
difficult for challengers to wage a
competitive campaign. As a result,
limiting the number of terms that a
member can serve as chairman has been
suggested by four House Democrats, led
by Oklahoma Representative David
McCurdy. They recommend that no
lawmaker should chair a committee for
more than eight years. McCurdy declares
that, "[s]ome committee chairmen are
more feared than the House leadership.
Our intent is to reduce the possible
arrogance that comes from having no
accountability" (Coyne and Fund 1992,
136).
Term limits are already imposed on
some chairs in Congress, and power
wielded by some chairmen who have limits
is somewhat greater than others who don't
(Coyne and Fund 1992, 137). Making
these limits for chairs universal would
probably decrease the entrenched power
that some chairman now monopolize.
Limiting the number of terms that all
members of Congress can serve, however,
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would also accomplish the task of breaking
a chairman's accumulation of undue
power, but only limiting the terms of
chairmanship would probably serve as a
less drastic means of breaking up this
power.
Franking
Under the current system, federal
lawmakers are given free mailing
privileges, paid for by the government.
During a campaign, incumbents can use
this franking advantage to get ahead of
their challengers who have to finance their
mailing with private funds. Under term
limit reform, franking would still exist-incumbents whose terms of office have not
expired would remain free to use this
advantage over their challengers. Open
seat elections, which would probably come
up once every six to twelve years, would
be the only elections where the role of
franking would be nonexistent.
Besides term limits, there are two ways
to attack this unfair incumbent advantage.
Incumbents' free mailing privileges could
be eliminated, or the same privileges could
be granted to challengers for the
campaign's duration. A comprehensive
implementation of the former proposal is
neither likely nor feasible; representatives
and senators also use their franking
privilege for non-campaign matters.
Nevertheless, some states, such as
Connecticut, impose a cutoff date for
franking as the election campaign for state
officials gets underway (Van Hom 1993,
128). The latter proposal could also
contribute to a possible cure--subsidizing
mailing activities of the challengers as well
as the incumbents. Elected officials would
probably prefer this reform over a cutoff
date; few would want to give up their
mailing privilege, even if the withdrawal
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was only temporary. If implemented,
however, one of these two reforms could
begin to put contenders on a level playing
field.
Staff
Along with franking, an incumbent
also enjoys a staff as well as a local office
paid for by the federal government. An
incumbent's staff members can help with
the election campaign by keeping their
boss updated on the issues and by
mobilizing campaign contributors and
volunteers. On the other hand, challengers
are forced to use their campaign funds for
the same services. Once again, term
limits would solve this imbalance only
periodically--once every six to twelve
years.
An alternative to term limits, therefore,
would include providing temporary staffs
and office space for challengers,
compliments of the federal government.
Although this would mean dipping into the
national treasury, incumbents would no
longer be alone in their ability to use a
well-staffed office at the government's
expense.
Money and Elections
Since the 1970's, campaign
expenditures have skyrocketed. In
constant 1990 dollars, aggregate
congressional campaign spending rose
from $196 million in 1974 to $405 million
in 1984 to $445 million in 1990 (Magleby
and Nelson 1990, 29), sustaining an
average yearly growth of $15.6 million.
Even more recently, the aggregate total of
$380 million spent by 1992's general
election candidates up to 20 days prior to
the election set a new record in the history
of America's campaign spending (FEC
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1992, 1). As a result, competitive
challengers must raise huge amounts of
money, and elected officials must spend a
large portion of their time raising
campaign funds rather than doing what
they were elected to do--make public
policy.
Along with increased campaign
expenditures and expanding fund raising
cycles, there has been a significant
proliferation of political action committees
(PACs). In 1974 there were 608 PACs,
and by the end of 1990 the number of
PACs had risen to 4,172 (Stanley and
Niemi 1992, 175). This climb in the
number of PACs has increased the amount
of money available to candidates because
unlike individual contributors, PACs are
not limited in the total amount of money
they can contribute during and election.
Additionally, individuals can only give
$1,000 per candidate while PACs can give
$5,000 per candidate. These two factors,
no total contribution limit and a relatively
high per-candidate contribution limit, have
added to the growth in the number of
PACs as well as the political influence of
the special interest groups that sustain
those PACs.
Furthermore, campaign contributions
are far from being divided equally among
candidates. As mentioned earlier, the
incumbent advantage is significant; in the
1992 election, political action committees
gave nine times as much money to
incumbents as they did to challengers
(Osgood 1992), and as a result, 93 percent
of the incumbents that made it to the
general election were reelected. This
reelection rate for incumbents is not
uncommon and reflects the laclc of
competition between officials seeking
another term of office and their
challengers. In regard to the 1992
elections, Fred Wortheimer, the president
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of Common Cause, said, "In a year when
'change' was the by-word of our national
elections, congressional incumbents were
once again protected in their races by a
wall of money" (Osgood 1992).
Money has definitely evolved into a
dominant election factor. Mentioned
above are three of the ways money has
manifested its influence on elections--Iong
fund raising cycles, disproportionate
influence of special interests, and lack of
competition between incumbents and
challengers. Will term limitations solve
these problems? Probably not. At most,
they will briefly alleviate the problems
once every six to twelve years. There are,
however, other reform proposals that may
prove to be successful in increasing
competition, decreasing dependence on
interest group money, and decreasing time
spent on fund raising.
One of the most debated reform
proposals is public finance of
congressional elections. Although the
federal government funds presidential
campaigns, no such funding exists for
congressional candidates. If administered
carefully, however, there is a high
probability that federal funding of
congressional elections would achieve the
goals of increasing candidate competition,
minimizing the role of interest groups, and
shortening fund raising cycles.
Public funding will make congressional
races more competitive because
challengers, who otherwise have a difficult
time raising money, will receive enough
public funds to wage an advertisement
campaign that will give them substantial
visibility. It is important to point out here
that public funding will not put incumbents
and challengers on level ground;
challengers need more money to be as well
known as their opponents. Nevertheless,
public financing would enable challengers
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to enjoy more name recognition than they
now have--under current campaign finance
laws, most challengers are unknown to
most constituents. Since much of the
campaign battle is public name
recognition, federal funds will help
challengers be more, although not equally,
competitive.
If public funds are to help campaigns
become more competitive, there is a
condition that the candidates must accept:
spending limits. Although the Supreme
Court has ruled that spending limits are
unconstitutional, voluntary spending limits
are not (Buckley v. Valeo 1976, 1). In
other words, if a candidate voluntarily
agrees to limit campaign spending by
accepting public funds in return, then the
spending limit is constitutional. Therefore,
public funds for congressional elections
need to be given on the condition that the
recipients limit their spending. Otherwise,
one of the candidates could significantly
outspend the other despite the presence of
public funds.
Public funding will also diminish the
role of special interest groups and their
PAC money. Since publicly financed
candidates will receive a substantial
amount of government money; they will
rely less on PAC contributions. This will
reduce the undue influence of special
interest groups.
Finally, candidates will have more time
available to engage in policy making
activities rather than fund raising activities.
Knowing that they will receive a large
portion of their campaign funds from the
government, incumbents as well as
challengers will not be preoccupied with
filling their calendars full of fund raising
events (Magleby 1993b).
Although public financing of
congressional elections will cost the
nation's taxpayers more money than term
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limits would, these taxpayers may be
pleased in the end. Politicians will be less
inclined to grant expensive favors to the
interest groups that used to fund their
elections; having greater competition from
their challengers, incumbents will work
harder to represent their constituents'
interests; and elected officials will have
more time to study the issues and therefore
become better policy makers. All of this
can be accomplished without limiting the
terms of lawmakers.
Besides public funding, there are other
proposals for campaign finance reform that
may prove to be more effective than term
limits. For example, it has been proposed
that individual contribution limits be
increased while PAC contributions be
decreased. This will supposedly diminish
the role of PACs and increase the role of
individual constituents. However, as long
as there is no limit on spending, fund
raising cycles will continue to lengthen and
competition will continue to be nominal.
Public funding, on the other hand, will
cause candidates to limit their spending,
and the public will enjoy the
accompanying benefits.
Conclusion
The conservative-influenced term limit
movement has gained a great deal of
popularity at a time when many Americans
are fed up with the way things are running
in Washington, D.C. In my opinion, term
limits would be a treatment rather than a
cure for the ills of Congress. As long as
the United States government retains its
powers to regulate, subsidize, spend, and
whatever else it wants to do, an unlimited
number of interest groups will make an
infinite number of request on elected
officials. These officials, in tum, will
look to these interest groups for help
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getting reelected. Term limits will hinder
this detrimental relationship only once
every six years (at the most). Therefore,
under term limit reform, the problems of a
troubled government will not go away,
they will only be slightly muted.
Alternatives to term limits, such as
term limits for chair positions, either
mutual or suspended franking privileges,
subsidized staffs for challengers, and

public funding of campaigns would attack
the causes of our government's illness
more directly. Nevertheless, whether term
limits will save America from itself
remains to be seen. In the meantime,
Americans will try to work out the
meaning as well as the constitutionality of
the nationwide plea, "Stop me before I
vote again!"
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